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COMMENT
THE BROADENED DIMENSIONS AND MORE POWERFUL
BITE OF THE STATE FAIR HOUSING ACT
INTRODUCTION
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
enables state and municipal agencies to provide Title VIII protec-
tion to persons discriminated against in the residential real estate
industry.1 The Federal Fair Housing Act (FFHA) requires HUD,
when possible, to refer Title VIII cases to substantially equivalent
agencies.' The Secretary of HUD authorizes the North Carolina
Human Relations Council, a substantially equivalent agency, to
hear fair housing claims which arise in this state.'
In an attempt to maintain HUD certification,4 the North Car-
olina legislature amended the State Fair Housing Act (ASFHA)5
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(f) (West Supp. 1989).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(f)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1989). In order to qualify as a
substantially equivalent agency, the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and
Equal Opportunity of HUD must certify that the state or local agency meets the
following criteria: (1) The law administered by the state or local agency must pro-
vide, on its face, substantially equivalent substantive rights, procedures, remedies,
and availability of judicial review as the FFAA. (2) Current practices and past
performace of the agency must "demonstrate that, in operation, the law in fact
provides rights and remedies which are substantially equivalent" to the FFAA. 24
C.F.R. § 115.2 (1989).
3. 51 Fed. Reg. 11577 (1986).
4. The FFHA requires that state or agencies with fair housing acts, such as
the State Fair Housing Act, modify their respective act to maintain certification
within 40 months of enactment of the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act. 42
U.S.C.A. § 3610(f)(4) (West Supp. 1989).
5. State Fair Housing Act, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 507 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A (1989)). For purposes of consistency and clarity, the
amended State Fair Housing Act will be called ASFHA, while the previous State
Fair Housing Act will be called SFHA. Likewise, the Federal Fair Housing
Amendments Act will be called FFHAA, while the previous Federal Fair Housing
Act will be called FFHA.
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resulting in a more effective weapon against discriminatory prac-
tices in the housing industry.' Part I of this Comment analyzes the
substantive changes in the Act. These substantive changes signifi-
cantly extend the scope of the protection against discriminatory
practices.' These changes mirror those in the recently amended
Federal Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968).8 Substantively, the Acts are now virtually identical. There
are, however, some differences of which the practitioner should be
aware.9 Part II discusses the procedural implications of the new
State Act. How the State and Federal Acts and agencies function
together in enforcement procedures is the primary focus of Part II.
I. SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS OF THE 1989 AMENDMENTS
The State Fair Housing Act (SFHA) already prohibited dis-
crimination against any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin in the buying, selling, and renting of residential
real estate and in related loan transactions.1 0 The ASFHA extends
this prohibition to discrimination against persons with handicaps'
and discrimination based on familial status. 2 The ASFHA also
clarifies the scope of prohibited practices. The new term "residen-
tial real estate related transactions"' 3 encompasses certain types of
transactions formerly too remote from residential real estate trans-
actions to be subject to scrutiny for dis'crimination under Title
VIII. 4
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A (1989). Two weapons against the fair housing of-
fender fall outside the scope of this comment. The first weapon makes it an "un-
lawful discriminatory housing practice to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere
with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, on account of having exercised or
enjoyed, or on account of having aided or encouraged any other person in the
exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected" by the SFHA. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 41A-4(e) (1989). The second provides federal criminal and civil sanctions
under similar circumstances as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A - 4(e) (1989). 42 U.S.C.A. §
3617 (1977 & West Supp. 1989).
7. See infra notes 10-115 and accompanying text.
8. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1977 & West Supp. 1989).
9. See infra notes 10-215 and accompanying text.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(b) (1983), repealed by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-
4(bl) (1989).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT § 41A-4(bl) (1989).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.115 - 100.135 (1989).
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A. Discrimination Against Handicapped People
The ASFHA extends Title VIII protection to handicapped
persons."6 There are also provisions to ensure that the special
needs of handicapped persons are met. 16 The ASFHA defines a
"handicapped condition '"17 as "a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life ac-
tivities, a record of having such an impairment, or being regarded
as having such an impairment."' 8 The scope of this definition
broadens the ordinary meaning of the word "handicap."19 Interpre-
tational problems confront application of this new definition. For
example, how does one deal with a drug-addicted victim of Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)? Although federal
regulations protect victims of AIDS,20 both the ASFHA and the
Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act (FFHAA) exclude current
users and addicts of controlled substances from protection.2 Many
AIDS victims have histories of controlled substance abuse. While
federal regulations include protection for alcoholics and other
types of drug addicts,22 the ASFHA is silent on the point. Whether
North Carolina would extend fair housing protection to the intra-
venous drug user infected with the AIDS virus lies in the discre-
tion of the courts. Even if a court would conclude that the ASFHA
protects such an AIDS victim, the ASFHA contains a catchall ex-
ception excluding from protection any individual "whose tenancy
would constitute a direct threat to the health and safety of other
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(a) (1983), as amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-
4(a) (1989).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(a)(2b)(2c) (1989).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-3(3a) (1989).
18. Id.
19. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines "handicapped" as
"having a physical or mental disability that substantially limits activity esp. in
relation to employment or education." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE Dic-
TIONARY 550 (9th ed. 1987).
20. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(2) (1989).
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(h) (West Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-3(3a)
(1989). A recently enacted statute provides that "it shall be unlawful to discrimi-
nate against any person having AIDS virus or HIV infection on account of that
infection in determining suitability for continued employment, housing, or public
services." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(i) (1989). The only remedy available for a
housing discrimination claim is to institute a civil action pursuant to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 41A-7 of the ASFHA. Id. § 130A-148(i) adds no protection beyond what is
already available under the ASFHA.
22. 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(2) (1989).
1990]
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persons or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical
damage to the property of others. 23 How effectively the ASFHA
protects these AIDS victims will depend upon court and agency
interpretation of this catchall exception.
The ASFHA not only protects handicapped people from tradi-
tional Title VIII discrimination, 2 but also contains special provi-
sions for the unique problems of the handicapped. There are three
such provisions: First, handicapped people may make reasonable
modifications of existing premises at their own expense;25 Second,
landlords and others must make reasonable accommodations in
rules, policies, and services for the handicapped;" and Third,
builders must satisfy special design and construction requirements
for multifamily dwellings.
1. Reasonable Modifications
The ASFHA prohibits discrimination against handicapped
buyers or tenants who must make reasonable modifications in a
dwelling to fully enjoy the property.28 This provision may signifi-
cantly impact landlords and property managers.2 9 Federal regula-
tions allow handicapped tenants to install grab bars in bathrooms
at tenants' expense.30 However, federal regulations allow the land-
lord to condition any modification on the tenant's promise to re-
move the grab bars and return the bathroom to the condition that
existed prior to the modification when the tenancy ends. 1 The re-
quirement of returning the property to its original condition ap-
plies only where a condition interferes with the landlords's or fu-
ture tenant's enjoyment of the property.3 2 For example, tenants
need not remove wall reinforcements added to support grab bars. 33
Such modifications would not substantially interfere with land-
lord's or future tenants' enjoyment of the premises. 4 If a tenant
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(b) (1989).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(a) (1989).
25. Id. at § 41A-4(2a).
26. Id. at § 41A-4(2b).
27. Id. at § 41A-4(2c).
28. Id. at § 41A-4(2a).
29. See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
30. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203(c) example 1 (1989).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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found it necessary to widen a bathroom door to use his wheelchair,
the widened doorway could likewise be left unaltered because a
widened doorway does not substantially interfere with the use and
enjoyment of property. 8
2. Reasonable Accommodations
The ASFHA provides that landlords may not refuse to grant
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services
when a handicapped person needs such accommodations for his
use and enjoyment of the premises." For example, a blind appli-
cant to an apartment complex with a "no pets" policy would be
allowed to have his seeing eye dog. 7 An applicant who is unable to
walk long distances could request a reserved parking space.38
These accommodations are necessary to afford the applicant an
equal opportunity to use and enjoy the apartment. To refuse such
requests results in a violation of federal regulations. 9
3. Design and Construction Requirements
The design and construction requirements of the ASFHA will
have a noticeable effect on the appearance of residences.4" The
ASFHA requires builders of apartments, condominiums and other
multifamily dwellings to design and construct new units so that
they are accessible to the handicapped and can readily be adapted
for use by persons in wheelchairs."1 After March 13, 1991, builders
must design "first occupancy" "covered multifamily dwellings"
which provide access for handicapped persons.2 Units are not sub-
35. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203(c) example 2 (1989).
36. N.C. GEN STAT. § 41A-4(2b) (1989).
37. 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) example 1 (1989). (This example and other exam-
ples drawn from federal regulations, is used to illustrate the SFHA because there
are no state regulations containing similar examples. In light of the General As-
sembly's intent that North Carolina retain its substantially equivalent certifica-
tion, these examples should be strongly persuasive in North Carolina courts.
Other federal examples follow this one for the same reason).
38. 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) example 2 (1989).
39. 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) (1989).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(2c) (1989).
41. Id.
42. 'Covered Multifamily Dwellings' means a building with four or more
units, including all units and common areas, if there is an elevator. It
also means a building with ground floor units and common areas in
elevatorless buildings. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-3(la) (1989).
1990]
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ject to the building requirements if occupied on or before March
13, 1991"1 The design and construction requirements include mak-
ing public and common use areas readily accessible, placing light
switches and other controls in accessible locations,45 and making
all rooms of a dwelling accessible to persons in wheelchairs."
Builders will satisfy the FFHA by complying with the pertinent
specifications of the American National Standard Institute (ANSI)
for buildings and facilities providing accessibility and usability for
physically handicapped people.47 The ASFHA states that it does
not "nullify any provisions of the North Carolina Building Code
for construction of residential housing for the handicapped" which
are more stringent."
B. Discrimination Against Families With Children
Section 41A-3(1B) of the ASFHA protects persons discrimi-
nated against because of familial status.49 The ASFHA defines this
protected class as " one or more persons who have not attained the
age of eighteen years being domiciled with: A. A parent or other
person having legal custody of the person or persons; or B. The
designee of the parent or other person having custody, provided
the designee has the written permission of the parent or other per-
son." 50 The protected class also includes any person in the process
of securing legal custody of a person under eighteen or any person
who is pregnant.5 1 HUD and commentators of the federal regula-
tions did not debate the scope of the protected class.2 While
determing the scope of the protected class should not produce
hardship for North Carolina in drafting its regulations, 53 the provi-
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(a)(2c)(b.1.) (1989).
44. Id. at § 41A-4(a)(2c)(b.4.).
45. Id. at § 41A-4(2c)b.3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(a)(2c)(b.3.).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(a)(2c)b.6. (1989).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(4) (West Supp. 1989). Copies of the ANSI A117.1-
1986 Standards may be obtained from the American National Standards Insti-
tute, Inc., 1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018.
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(d)(1989).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-3(lb) (1989).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Commentary to the Federal Fair Housing Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232,
3238 (1989) [hereinafter Commentary].
53. The North Carolina Human Relations Council should come out with its
regulations sometime in 1990. Telephone interview with Daniel D. Addison, Gen-
eral Counsel to the North Carolina Human Relations Council (Oct 19, 1989).
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sion itself presents difficulties. These difficulties surface when at-
tempting to understand concerning housing exemptions for the
elderly. 4
1. NCGS Section 41A(e)(6): The Sixty-two and Over
Exemption
The first exemption applies to housing "intended for and
solely occupied by persons 62 years of age and older."55 This word-
ing, found in both the State and Federal Acts, requires that any
person residing in a unit meet the age requirement for the manage-
ment to maintain the special exempt status of the housing.56 The
ASFHA provides details in the statute that reflects some variance
from the HUD's administrative regulations and the federal
statute.5
7
For instance, a slight variation exists between the state and
federal interpretation of the date after which only applicants
meeting the age requirement may be accepted. 8 Under the
ASFHA, the age requirement applies to occupants entering after
October 1, 1989 (the effective date of ASFHA), but does not apply
to occupants already living in a unit on this date. 9 HUD, on the
other hand, has determined that the FFHA protects only those
persons "residing in such housing as of the date of enactment of
this Act (i.e., September 13, 1988)."0 This restricts occupancy
even before the effective date of the AFFHA 1
The age requirement exception protects persons already living
in a unit from unfair eviction.2 Innocent tenants who leased units
in all-adult complexes up until the effective date of the Federal
Act should not be evicted for failure to meet the age requirement."3
HUD's literal interpretation defeats the protective purpose of the
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e) (1989).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(2) (1989).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3607(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-
6(e)(2) (1989).
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3605 (West Supp. 1989); 24 C.F.R. § 100.300-.304 (1989);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(2) (1989).
58. 24 C.F.R. § 100.303(a)(1) & .304(d)(1) (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-
6(e)(2)-(3) (1989).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(2) (1989).
60. 24 C.F.R. § 100.303(a)(1) (1989) (emphasis added).
61. Commentary, supra note 52, at 3253.
62. Id.
63. Id.
1990] 273
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age requirement exception." The age requirement exception does
not protect tenants who first resided in a unit between the date of
enactment and the effective date of the FFHAA 5 Landlords or
property managers would have to evict these tenants to comply
with the exemption." Some period of decision-making time should
be allowed.
North Carolina's Act extends protection to tenants residing in
a unit at the effective date of the ASFHA.6 7 Any complaints re-
ceived by HUD would be routed to the North Carolina Human Re-
sources Council (NCHRC) which would apply the ASFHA.6 The
difference between the FFHAA and the ASFAA on this point is
not great enough to endanger North Carolina's status as a jurisdic-
tion having a "substantially equivalent" statute and regulations. 9
The ASFHA version goes further to prevent unfair eviction7"
HUD regulations and the ASFHA allow resident employees
performing "substantial services directly related to management or
maintenance of the housing," along with family members, to live in
a unit even though they do not meet the age requirement. 1 If,
however, the employee works primarily at another complex belong-
ing to the employer, the employee does not qualify to live in the
complex.72
Anyone under the age limit who inherits a unit in a sixty-two
exemption complex would have to rent or sell the unit to someone
meeting the age requirement.73 There are no statutory or regula-
tory exceptions for occupants, such as live-in nurses, whose pres-
ence in a unit is necessary for an elderly person's enjoyment of the
unit. An elderly person requiring a live-in nurse to function should,
however, qualify as handicapped.74 The elderly person, then, could
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(2) (1989).
68. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(f) (West Supp. 1989); 24 C.F.R. § 100.303 (1989);
Commentary supra note 52, at 3256.
69. 24 C.F.R. § 115.1-.11 (1989).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(a)(2) (1989); See also Commentary, surpa note
52, at 3256.
71. 24 C.F.R. § 100.303(a)(3) (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e) (1989).
72. 24 C.F.R. §100.303(a)(3) (1989) Commentary, supra note 52, at 3253. N.C.
GEN. STAT. §41A-6(e) (1989).
73. A person not meeting the age requirement could own a unit, but he could
not use it himself.
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3605 (West Supp. 1989); 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(a) (1989);
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request a reasonable modification in the age requirement to accom-
modate his special need of a live-in nurse. 5 A second familial sta-
tus exemption, the fifty-five and over exemption, allows more flexi-
bility for such persons and does not require all occupants to meet
the rigid age requirement.76
2. NCGS Section 41A(e)(7): The Fifty-five and Over
Exemption
This second familial status exemption applies to housing
which is operated for occupancy by at least one person fifty-five
years of age or older.77 The Act further requires the housing com-
plex meet certain criteria that indicate the complex is operated
primarily for the benefit of the older occupants.78 HUD's interpre-
tation of the FFHAA allows the State to set higher age limits.7 9
The ASFHA, however, mirrors the federal provisions.8 0 and also
clarifies several points covered by HUD regulations but not found
in the FFHA. s1
Housing facilities eligible for this exemption must provide
"significant facilities and services specifically designed to meet the
physical and social needs of older persons. '82 If this is not practica-
ble, the housing must at least provide "important housing opportu-
nities for older persons."83 Neither HUD nor the NCHRC has any
procedural system which can guarantee that a facility will meet
these requirements before development.8 4 The HUD regulations
do, however, provide a nonexhaustive list of the types of special
facilities and services which might be necessary to meet the needs
of older persons.8 5 There is also a list of factors relevant for decid-
ing whether services and facilities are not practicable.8 "
The ASFHA allows a certain percentage of noncomplying
Commentary, supra note 52, at 3249; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(a)(2b) (1989).
75. Id.
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3607(b)(2)(C) (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(3) (1989).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Commentary, supra note 52, at 3254-55.
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(3) (1989).
81. See infra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(3) (1989).
83. C.F.R. 100.304(b)(2) (1989).
84. Id.
85. 24 C.F.R. § 100.304(b)(1) (1989).
86. 24 C.F.R. § 100.304(b)(2) (i)-(vi.) (1989).
1990] 275
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units to exist in a housing facility.87 The ASFHAA requires that at
least 80% of the occupied units be occupied by at least one person
fifty-five years old or older.8 8 Twenty percent of the units may be
occupied by persons not complying with the age requirements. 9
The purpose behind allowing this variance is to allow some flexibil-
ity for occupants under fifty-five, such as persons who might end
up owning a unit after a person meeting the age requirement
dies. 0 Thanks to the allowable noncompliance rate, spouses or co-
habitants have the option of continuing in their home when the
person qualifying dies.91 Persons acquiring title to a condominium
subject to the stricter sixty-two or over exception would not be,
able to occupy the property and could only sell the property to
someone meeting the age requirement or willing to rent the prop-
erty to qualified applicants.92 The lower age requirement and
added flexibility of this exemption promote the marketability of
property and increases the chances of success for housing projects
for the elderly.
In order to give new projects a chance to start up without the
burden of meeting the eighty percent requirement, the General As-
sembly has incorporated part of a HUD regulation into the text of
the ASFHA, relating to "newly constructed housing facilities." ' A
newly constructed housing facility need not meet the eighty per-
cent requirement until twenty-five percent of the units are occu-
pied.94 The only difference between this HUD regulation and the
corresponding North Carolina statute is that the effective dates are
different.9 5
As with the sixty-two and over exemption, units occupied by
employees may be excepted from the age requirement.96 There
arises some ambiguity in interpreting whether a complex meets the
eighty percent requirement when there are employee-occupied
units. For example, if a one hundred unit apartment complex had
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(1) (1989).
88. Id. at § 41A-6(e)(2).
89. Id.
90. Commentary, supra note 52, at 3254-55.
91. Id.
92. See supra, note 74. Commentary, supra note 52, at 3254.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(3) (1989).
94. Id.
95. 24 C.F.R. § 100.304(c)(1) (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(3) (1989).
96. 24 C.F.R. § 100.304(d)(3)(1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6(e)(3) (1989). See
supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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eighty complying units and twenty noncomplying units, what
would the effect be of replacing one of the eighty complying units
with an under-aged employee? Under a literal interpretation of the
wording of the ASFHA and the HUD regulation, the complex re-
tains its status as exempt. "Housing satisfies the requirements of
subdivisions (2) and (3) of this subsection even though there are
units occupied by employees. . . under the minimum age...,97
Employee-occupied units should be counted as complying units
rather than just not counted. This would not disturb the original
eighty percent compliance rate. Yet under HUD's regulation, the
most likely result is the loss of the exemption. HUD would sub-
tract units occupied by employees from the total units, so twenty
percent of ninety-nine units would have to comply with the age
requirement under this hypothetical.9 The prudent landlord
should never allow his complex to approach twenty percent
noncompliance.
Any complex approaching the twenty percent threshold should
be warned that although intentionally renting a few units to
noneligible persons is not per se a violation of the exemption sta-
tus, it could be evidence of a lack of intention to reserve the prop-
erty for older persons. 100 Also, the higher the noncompliance rate,
the greater the risk that unforseen deaths or property transfers
may threaten the exempt status of the facility.' 0 '
In addition to meeting the eighty percent age requirement and
providing special services for the older person, qualified housing
must publish and adhere to policies and procedures to show they
intend to attract applicants meeting the age requirement.' 0 ' When
faced with problems concerning whether a housing complex meets
the standards to qualify for the fifty-five and over exemption, an
attorney should be careful to draft policies and procedures which
clearly indicate that the property is to provide housing to persons
fifty-five and over. The eighty percent requirement sounds omi-
97. Id.
98. Commentary, supra note 52, at 3256.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-6 (e)(3); 42 U.S.C.A. § 3607 (b)(2)(c)(iii) (West
Supp. 1989); 24 C.F.R. § 100.304 (c)(2)(i)(vi) (1989); Commentary, supra note 52
at 3255. (HUD removed a proposed example because it sounded as if the 20%
allowable nonconformance rate was a safe harbor for compliance with the 55 and
over exemption).
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nous; the owner or manager of a housing facility cannot control
who occupies each unit. Particularly in the large facilities, there
might be time when because of deaths of qualified tenants or a
poor market, the units may be close to or over the twenty percent
threshold. However, if management policies and facilities reflect an
intent to provide housing for older persons, no investigation is
likely.
C. The Expanded Scope of Transactions Subject to Title VIII
Scrutiny
Not only have the Federal and State Acts added new pro-
tected classes to Title VIII, but both have expanded coverage to
include transactions formerly on the periphery of coverage.10 3 The
ASFHA covers all persons or business entities involved in "resi-
dential real estate related transactions."1 °4 Both the FFHAA and
the ASFHA cover the conduct of purchasers on the secondary
mortgage market, 05 and the conduct of appraisers of residential
real estate.106 The FFHAA contains an appraisal exemption which
states that appraisers may take into account factors other than
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap, or familial sta-
tus when appraising real property.10 7
This appraisal exemption appears undefinable, unless one con-
siders that federal and state courts do not always require discrimi-
natory intent to find a Title VIII violation. Often plaintiffs must
only prove "disparate impact" (or "disparate effect") against a
protected class to prove a prima facie case of housing discrimina-
tion.108 This standard of proof of discrimination first arose in Title
VII employment discrimination cases' 0 9 and soon was incorporated
103. 24 C.F.R. § 100.50-.90 (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(bl) (1989)
(Before the Fair Housing Acts were amended, appraisers, purchasers of mort-
gages, insurers, and others who indirectly participate in residential real estate
transactions, were on the periphery of coverage).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(bl) (1989).
105. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3605 (b)(1) (West Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-4(bl)
(1989). (Purchasers the secondary mortgage market buy mortgages or similar in-
struments from the mortgagee lending institution).
106. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3605 (c) (West Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-
4(bl)(2) (1989).
107. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3605 (c) (West Supp. 1989).
108. Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an Employment Dis-
crimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 564
(1986).
109. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (lack of intent to
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into Title VIII fair housing litigation." ° By allowing a demonstra-
tion of disparate impact to stand as a prima facie case for plain-
tiffs, the more insidious and subtle forms of discrimination are
discouraged."'
One such subtle form of discrimination occurs where apprais-
ers have consistently lowered value estimates based on racial com-
position of neighborhoods. Appraisers no longer expressly consider
race as a factor in appraisals, yet "less overt forms of racial ap-
praisal practices can result in equally pernicious consequences.""' 2
Evidence of discrimination in appraisal today is likely to be an un-
spoken, hidden factor. Proving discriminatory intent would, there-
fore, be difficult if not impossible. But allowing too broad a stan-
dard of adverse impact would interfere with the appraiser's job of
producing accurate market valuations of property." 3 The federal
appraisal exemption probably protects appraisers who have relied
on legitimate economic factors and established appraisal methods.
The federal appraisal exemption and the related HUD regulations
leave unresolved, however, the degree to which appraisers may le-
gally consider subjective neighborhood factors or features." 4
Where a complaint has shown a discriminatory pattern in an ap-
praiser's valuations, the appraisal exemption apparently shifts the
burden to the appraiser to prove his low property valuations were
based on "factors other than race, color, religion, national origin,
sex, handicap or familial status.""' 5 Absent the exemption apprais-
ers would have to prove that their consideration of factors which
have discriminatory impact is a matter of business necessity."'
The best protection for an appraiser from fair housing complaints
is a well-documented appraisal report.
North Carolina has not adopted the federal appraisal exemp-
discriminate in employment does not preclude a violation of Title VII); Title VII
prohibits employment practices which discriminate against people because of
race, color, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
110. Payne v. Bracher, 582 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1978); Smith v. Sol D. Adler
Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970).
111. Calmore, North Carolina's Retreat from Fair Housing: A Critical Eval-
uation of North Carolina Human Relations Council v. Weaver Realty, 16 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 154 (1986).
112. Dennis, The Fair Housing Act of 1988: A New Source of Lender Liabil-
ity, 106 BANKING L.J. 405, 422 (1989).
113. See supra note 112, at 422; see also supra note 108, at 594-95.
114. See supra note 108 at 593.
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3605 (c) (West Supp. 1989).
116. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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tion. The State has statutorily recognized disparate impact as suffi-
cient to constitute a violation under the ASFHA, which also pro-
vides for the business necessity exception as well. 117 Although
there have been no appellate decisions concerning disparate impact
since this amendment was enacted, the ASFHA, on its face, places
a greater burden of proof on the appraiser than the federal ap-
praisal exemption. 118 The history behind the enactment of this
amendment will be covered in depth in Part II."
II. PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE AMENDED FAIR
HOUSING ACT
A. Interrelationship of HUD and the North Carolina Human
Relations Council
In order to understand the procedures and enforcement of the
ASFHA, it is necessary to examine the relationship of the North
Carolina Human Relations Council (NCHRC) to HUD. The North
Carolina General Assembly authorizes the NCHRC to accept fair
housing complaints only during the time HUD certifies that the
NCHRC is a substantially equivalent agency. 1 9 Understanding
how the state and federal agencies interrelate and function to-
gether, both formally and informally, clarifies how the ASFHA and
NCHRC function. This section will first examine the actions of
HUD, NCHRC, and the General Assembly in reaction to the
Weaver Realty case, then will examine HUD's administrative con-
trols over "substantially equivalent" state and local agencies.
1. Administrative and Legislative Reactions to the Weaver
Realty Case
The question of whether North Carolina recognizes adverse
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-5(a) (1987). North Carolina courts have never de-
fined business necessity, but the Fourth Circuit has. "Where employment prac-
tice, which may exclude black employees is job related, the practice is not dis-
criminatory and the touchstone is business necessity." White v. Carolina
Paperboard Corp, 564 F.2d 1073, 1080 (4th Cir. 1977). Under the business neces-
sity defense, the question is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business
purpose such that the practice is necessary to safe and efficient operation of the
business." Tippet v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 402 F. Supp. 934, 947
(M.D.N.C. 1975).
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4(bl)(2) (1989).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(a) (1989).
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impact in the absence of intent to discriminate as a violation of the
ASFHA was the subject of one of two fair housing cases to reach
the North Carolina Court of Appeals.1 20 The Court of Appeals held
that adverse impact was mere circumstantial evidence of discrimi-
nation and that intent to discriminate was a necessary element to a
fair housing claim. 2 ' Since the court remanded the case and the
evidence of intentional discrimination was strong, the defendants
settled the case before trial. 22 The next year, the General Assem-
bly passed an amendment which states that adverse impact is suf-
ficient to violate the SFHA.123
Soon after the Court of Appeals handed down its Weaver Re-
alty decision, the General Counsel's office in Washington telephone
NCHRC to request information about the case. 2  Having reviewed
the case, the General Counsel decided Weaver Realty alone did
not threaten NCHRC's status as "substantially equivalent.' ' 25 Be-
cause the North Carolina Supreme Court did not decide the case,
these same issues could still be raised in some subsequent case. 2
In 1987, one year after Weaver Realty, the NCHRC was the
primary organization to propose the 1987 amendments to the
SFHA. 2 7 The General Assembly clarified the Act by rewriting
parts of N.C.G.S. Section 41A-5 to recognize adverse impact as suf-
ficient to be a violation of the SFHA. 28 The revised statute does
make an exception where a person proves "his action or inaction
was motivated and justified by business necessity."'' 29 This 1987
amendment wrote the adverse impact theory .of federal case law
into the SFHA. 3 °
HUD's informal handling of the Weaver Realty decision, by
telephone conversation and by review of trial and appellate records
demonstrates HUD's deference for decision-making in "substan-
120. North Carolina Human Relations Council v. Weaver Realty Co., 79 N.C.
App. 710, 340 S.E.2d 766 (1986).
121. Id. at 715, 340 S.E.2d at 769.
122. Interview with Daniel D. Addison, General Counsel to the North Caro-
lina Human Relations Council (Oct. 22, 1989) (A transcript of this interview is on
file at Campbell University School of Law) [hereinafter, Interview].
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-5(a)(2) (1987).
124. Interview, supra note 122.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-5(a)(1983) (1987).
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-5(a)(2) (1989).
130. Interview, supra note 122.
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tially equivalent" fair housing systems. Even without becoming di-
rectly involved the possibility of HUD involvement gave NCHRC
and the General Assembly an incentive to amend the law before a
challenge to "substantially equivalency" could be raised.
2. HUD Regulation of NCHRC Investigations and Cases
There are two levels of HUD review of the performance of
NCHRC. 131' On the first level, the individual case level, HUD
monitors all complaints from the time of filing. 132 No matter
whether first filed with NCFRC or with HUD, both agencies estab-
lish files on all cases which arise in North Carolina. 33 When a case
is complete, NCFRC forwards copies of investigation results and
determinations, memos of conciliation results, or copies of settle-
ment agreements, depending on the outcome of the case, to a HUD
monitor working in the HUD regional office in Atlanta.13 4 Where
the holding in a particular case raises questions about the substan-
tial equivalency of a jurisdiciton's law, as happened in the Weaver
Realty case, HUD may investigate. 35 HUD may take over cases or
investigations from NCHRC if NCHRC fails to commence with
proceedings thirty days after receiving the referral or complaint,"3
if NCHRC after commencement fails to carry out the proceedings
reasonably promptly, 37 or if NCHRC loses it certification as "sub-
stantially equivalent. ' ' 3 '
On the second level, HUD regularly inspects general opera-
tions of NCHRC.139 At least once a year, the HUD regional moni-
tor inspects all the files "as they are" at NCHRC's office and
makes suggestions on how NCHRC can improve law
management.141
At least once every five years, or upon petition of an interested
person or organization, HUD must extensively review NCHRC's
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. North Carolina Human Relations Council v. Weaver Realty Co., 79 N.C.
App. 710, 340 S.E.2d 766 (1986).
136. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(f)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
137. Id. at § 3610(f)(2)(B).
138. Id. at § 3610(f)(2)(C).
139. Interview, supra note 122.
140. Id.
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administration of the SFHA."4 The HUD Assistant Secretary for
Fair Housing Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity
examines the law on its face1"2 and the quality of the state agency's
administration of that law43 in determining whether to recertify
the agency.144
Although HUD provides some supervision and control of
NCHRC handling of cases, HUD generally will not interfere with
NCHRC's handling of a case. 145 Since North Carolina fair housing
complaints will be referred to NCHRC anyway and there are no
special advantages in filing first with HUD, an attorney should rec-
ommend that a person with a complaint go to NCHRC. Even if the
attorney intends to take the case to court himself, he should still
take advantage of the free discovery NCHRC supplies through its
initial investigation. The NCHRC investigation saves the attorney
time and the client money.
B. Enforcing the State Fair Housing Act: New Weapons
One fair housing scholar has described housing discrimination
as totally "unabated, entrenched and impervious to public policy
and civil rights enforcement."" 6 According to a 1979 HUD-funded
survey, each year some two million acts of housing discrimination
are committed, yet few complaints are filed."17 Of the less than
5,000 complaints HUD receives per year,"48 NCHRC handles
around forty of these complaints." 9 One factor often criticized has
been the relative impotence of the enforcement provisions of the
FFHA. 50 As the statutory basis for HUD's certification of the
NCHRC as a "substantially equivalent" agency, the original SFHA
mirrored the FFHA in most important respects and contained the
141. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(f)(5) (West Supp. 1989).
142. Id. at § 3610(f)(5).
143. 24 C.F.R. § 115.3-.4 (1989).
144. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(f)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
145. Interview, supra note 122.
146. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second
Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1989).
147. Id. at 1052.
148. Waldrop, Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act: What Role Should the
Federal Government Play?, 74 Ky. L.J. 201, 203 (1985)(remarks of John J.
Knapp, General Counsel for HUD).
149. Interview, supra note 122.
150. Kushner, supra note 145, at 1050; Comment, Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 249 (1989).
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same weaknesses.151
As originally enacted, an aggrieved party would file a com-
plaint with the NCHRC.'52 Then, the NCHRC would investigate
and determine whether there were reasonable grounds for the com-
plaint."' If the NCHRC found reasonable grounds, the SFHA in
conjunction with the FFHA, provided three methods of dealing
with violations.154 First, complainant and respondent could volun-
tarily submit to conciliation by NCHRC. 1'55 Second, complainant
could voluntarily file suit in state superior court with the assis-
tance of NCHRC5'5 or in federal or state court with his own pri-
vate attorney.157 Third, in cases where HUD or NCHRC estab-
lished a "pattern or practice" of discrimination, the United States
Attorney General could sue respondent on behalf of the United
States. 58 Each method of enforcement had its disadvantages. The
ASFHA improves investigation and enforcement procedures and
adds a new procedure for enforcement called the administrative
hearing.'59
1. Investigation and Reconciliation Attempts
Investigation and reconciliation actions have been, until now,
the most frequent proceedings used by NCHRC in handling fair
housing claims.' 60 The purpose of the investigation is to determine
whether there are reasonable grounds for claimant to believe he
has or is about to be injured by a violation of the ASFHA.' 61 Of
the roughly forty investigations NCHRC makes in a year, only half
result in a reasonable grounds determination." 2
The ASFHA does not change the substance of the investiga-
tion but does modify the procedure to insure compliance with Con-
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1968) amended by 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-19,
3631 (1977 & West Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A (1983) (amended 1988).
152. Interview, surpa note 122.
153. Id.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1982), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 3614(a) (West
Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(d),(g),(h) (1983) (amended 1989).
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(d),(g) (1983) (amended 1989).
156. Id. at § 41A-7(h)(2) (1983).
157. Id. at § 41A-7(h)(1) (1983). Interview, supra note 122.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1982), as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 3614(a) (West
Supp. 1989).
159. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(1) (1989).
160. Interview, supra note 122.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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gress's and HUD's standards of reasonable promptness. Com-
plaints may be filed with NCHRC within one year after the alleged
discriminatory practice occurred. 6 ' Upon filing of a complaint,
NCHRC has ten days to serve a letter on complainant acknowledg-
ing receipt of the complaint and informing the complainant of his
forum choices under the State and Federal Acts.16 During this
same period, NCHRC must serve respondent a copy of the com-
plaint and a letter of notification, informing respondent of his right
to answer the complaint within ten days and explaining the proce-
dures involved in a complaint.6 5 NCHRC must commence the in-
vestigation within thirty days of respondent's filing of the com-
plaint 6 ' or send the complaint to another State or local agency
with the same or greater jurisdiction.'67
The investigation by NCHRC is nonadversarial; it is not a
hearing.'68 The investigator talks to witnesses and to parties to the
complaint and gathers what evidence he can.6 9 Later, the informa-
tion is shared with all parties and everyone has an opportunity to
comment on the testimony gathered or the questions asked. 70 At-
torneys may use whatever information is gathered as free discov-
ery.' 7 1 The investigation is required to be completed within ninety
days of the filing unless NCHRC gives notice in writing to the par-
ties of the reasons for delay. 172 If the investigation takes longer
than 130 days from the day of filing to complete, complainant is
automatically entitled to a right-to-sue letter upon written re-
quest. 73 The new procedures guarantee both the complainant and
the respondent a right to a speedy investigation. Speedier investi-
gations should encourage persons to make complaints and cause
less hardship on innocent respondents.
If the complaint is not resolved before the investigation is
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(b) (1989).
164. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(a) (1989).
165. Id.
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(e) (1989).
167. Id. at at §41A-7(c). (The existence of another state or local agency with
the same or greater jurisdiction divests NCHRC of jurisdiction).
168. Interview, supra note 122. However, the investigation has the potential
for becoming adversarial because of the NCHRC's power to subpeona and issue
interrogatories during investigation. N.C. GEN. STAT § 41A-8 (1989).
169. Interview, surpa note 122.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(e) (1989).
173. Id. at § 41A-7(i)(2).
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complete, upon completion of the investigation, NCHRC shall is-
sue a reasonable grounds determination.'1 4 If NCHRC finds no
reasonable grounds, the complaint is dismissed, and complainant
receives a right-to-sue letter which allows the complainant to bring
a civil action in superior court.'7 5 NCHRC's finding of no cause is
practically the death knell to any further action by the complain-
ant.176 No complainant has ever brought suit in North Carolina af-
ter a dismissal. 77 However, if NCHRC finds reasonable grounds,
the next step is to informally attempt to conciliate. 1
78
Daniel D. Addison, General Counsel to NCHRC, considers one
of the primary functions of the NCHRC is to provide an informal
conciliatory forum before a situation requires litigation.179 Before
the 1989 amendments, when conciliation failed, the complainant
had to voluntarily decide whether to file suit. 80 Although the
SFHA did provide for NCHRC representation the complainant the
cost of hiring independent counsel, the hassle and emotional ex-
penses of going to trial kept some complainants out of court. 8 '
Now, unless voluntary conciliation works or any of the parties or
NCHRC elects to take the case to superior court, the ASFHA pro-
vides for an automatic administrative hearing.'82 The specter of
potentially expensive and unavoidable legal proceedings gives the
respondent a greater incentive to settle than ever before.' 83 Ken-
tucky reported greater success in its fair housing conciliation ef-
forts after implementing a similar administrative hearing process
as adopted in North Carolina.18
Conciliation agreements are subject to approval by NCHRC
and must be made public, unless all parties agree otherwise and
NCHRC determines that disclosure is unnecessary to further the
174. Id. at § 41A-7(e).
175. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(f) (1989).
176. Interview, supra note 122.
177. Id.
178. Id. Although conciliation efforts often start after the reasonable grounds
determination, the NCHRA investigator may decide to try informal negotiating
and mediation at any time. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(d) (1989).
179. Interview, surpa note 122.
180. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-A7(h) (1983), as amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. §
41A-7(h),(1) (1989).
181. Interview, supra note 122.
182. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(l) (1989).
183. Kusher, supra note 146, at 1097.
184. Schwemer, Kentucky is a Leader in Fair Housing Enforcement, 52 Ky.
BENCH & BAR 26(4) (1988).
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purposes of the SFHA.185 The chance to avoid public disclosure of
a fair housing violation could be yet another powerful bargaining
chip for settlement, but this depends on how NCHRC interprets
its duty to disclose violations. The HUD regulations provide that
even when all parties agree not to disclose the agreement, the
records of the agreement would still be a matter of public
record. '8
NCHRC should retain more flexibility than HUD to deter-
mine whether an agreement must be made public. Every case
which can be settled before reaching court or an administrative
hearing saves the taxpayer money and litigant's time. The success
of a real estate brokerage firm or a bank depends on its reputation.
An agreement not to disclose a violation could bring about more
cooperation and prevent an inequitably harsh punishment in some
circumstances where the offense is relatively minor.
2. The Administrative Hearing Process
The administrative hearing process begins twenty days after
NCHRC issues its notice of failure to conciliate unless some party
or NCHRC elects otherwise."8 7 Once the election period lapses, the
administrative hearing is inevitable.188 The hearing will be con-
ducted as set forth in Article 3A of the North Carolina Administra-
tive Procedures Act,"89 except that NCHRC's attorney will present
respondent's case, not independent counsel.1 90 An administrative
law judge (ALJ) conducts the hearing in the capacity of a presiding
officer.191 The ALJ proposes a decision based on his conclusions of
law and findings of fact.192 The full Council or a panel of three
Council members makes the final decision. 93 Before the Council
makes its decision, it must carefully review the ALJ's findings of
fact and conclusions of law, and give each party the opportunity to
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(g) (1989).
186. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610 (b)(4) (West Supp. 1989).
187. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(k)(l) (1989).
188. Id. An attorney should decide whether to take his client's case to feder-
eal court before the end of this 20 day period. Otherwise, the attorney must take
the appeal of the administrative decision through the state courts.
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B(3A) (1987).
190. Id. at § 41A-7(l)(1).
191. Id. at § 41A-7(l)(2).
192. Id.
193. Id. at § 41A-7(l)(3).
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present exceptions and propose findings of fact.1 '" Each party must
also be given an opportunity to present oral and written arguments
to the Council.195
The Council has the power to award "relief as may be appro-
priate," including compensatory damages, injunctive and other eq-
uitable relief.196 In addition, the Council may assess a civil penalty
limited by the number of prior violations in a time period. 9 7 Judi-
cial review of the administrative decision can be sought from the
Court of Appeals. 9"
Beyond facilitating conciliation efforts as mentioned above,
the administrative hearing process should be a cheaper, more con-
sistent forum for complainants and respondents. '99 The adminis-
trative hearing is less formal and public than a civil trial. One
scholar researched all prior fair housing trials and, enforcement
proceedings in federal and state court and agencies up until
1983.200 He found that should blacks had the best chance of suc-
cess in state courts and administrative hearings in those states
with "substantially equivalent" agencies.2"' For respondents, the
risk of facing a jury can be a costly risk. Although an administra-
tive hearing can result in high damage awards and civil penalties,
the amount of damages or penalties is usually lower than in a civil
trial.20 2 The results, however, may be more predictable."'
194. Id. at § 41A-7(l)(2).
195. Id.
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(l)(3) (1989).
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(l)(3)a-c (1989). Council's order for civil penal-
ties may be up to $10,000 where "respondent has not been adjudged to have com-
mitted any prior unlawful discriminatory housing practice." Id. at § 41A-7(l)(3)a.
The civil penalties may be up to $25,000 where respondent has been adjudged to
have committed a violation within 5 years of the filing date of the second com-
plaint. Id. at § 41A-7(l)(3)b. The penalty may be up to $75,000 where respondent
has been adjudged to have committed 2 or more violations within a 7 year period
ending on the filing date of the complaint. Id. at § 41A-7(l)(3)c.
198. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(m) (1989).
199. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
200. Rice, Judicial Enforcement of Fair Housing Laws: An Analysis of Some
Unexamined Problems that the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1983 Would
Eliminate, 27 How. L.J. 227 (1984).
201. Id at 267.
202. J. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION, app. 9-1 (1983 and Supp. 1988) (This index
lists damages awards and their jurisdiction and shows that administrative hear-
ings result in lower awards).
203. Rice, supra note 200, at 259.
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3. Civil Trial
Before passage of ASFHA, complainant's only recourse to a
failure to conciliate was to bring a civil action either in federal or
state court.204 The complainant, however, had to volunteer to go to
court.2 5 The ASFHA makes few changes to the scheme of bringing
suit in state superior court 2 0 Complainant has one year to file suit
rather than 180 days as under the old State Act.20 7 Where the pre-
vailing party is a state agency or commission, the court is no longer
barred from awarding court costs.2 0 8 The state court option re-
mains the same except for these two provisions. The federal court
option, on the other hand, has been vastly improved in light of the
federal amendments. Since the option to file suit in federal court is
always possible for the respondent, these changes demand atten-
tion at this point.
In contrast to the North Carolina statute of limitations of one
year from the issuance of a right-to-sue letter or from the time of
the alleged violation, the FFHAA allows an injured person two
years, excluding time in administrative procedures, to bring suit.20 9
Further, the court is now to authorized to appoint an attorney for
the aggrieved person or authorize commencement of the action
without fees, costs or security.2 10 The FFHAA authorizes attorney's
fees and court costs to prevailing parties except the United
States.21'
Where "issues of public importance" or "patterns and prac-
tices of resistance" to the FFHAA arise, the Attorney General is
authorized to intervene in an already commenced civil suit or com-
mence his own suit which complainant may join.212 In cases which
are prosecuted by the Justice Department, the amendments allow
damage awards to complainants the same as if the suit was an or-
dinary civil suit.21 3 For the respondent, the presence of the Attor-
204. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1968) (amended 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-
7(h)(1) (1983) (amended 1989).
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7(j) (1983) (amended 1989).
206. Id.
207. Id. at § 41A-7(b).
208. Id. at § 41A-7(j).
209. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(a)(1)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 41A-7(b) (1989).
210. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
211. Id. at § 3612.
212. Id. at § 3613(e), 3614(a).
213. Id. at § 3612(d).
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ney General can mean even greater civil penalties than available in
a state or federal civil suit or administrative hearing." 4 The fact
that the complainant first filed with NCHRC or commenced a civil
action in state court does not keep the Justice Department from
taking over an investigation or litigation.21 '5 The Justice Depart-
ment has carried out several investigations in North Carolina.1 6
In light of the improved private suit and Justice Department
suit options, the federal forum is now equal to the state forum. An
attorney who takes a fair housing case has more flexibility now
than ever before for forum shopping. The attorney can take advan-
tage of NCHRC's offer of free discovery to establish whether there
is reasonable cause, then either take the case to federal court or
allow NCHRC to attempt to conciliate. If effort fails, an attorney
can still advise the client to choose either state or federal courts or
an administrative hearing. If an injured party chooses not to seek
independent counsel, he still has the competent support of
NCHRC to enforce his claim.
CONCLUSION
The ASFHA expands the scope of protected classes to include
handicapped people and families with children. Its definition of a
handicapped person is broader than the ordinary meaning of the
word, and the protection for these persons is tailored to their spe-
cial needs. This provision of the ASFHA will change the way
apartment buildings are constructed and make most future hous-
ing accessible to handicapped people. The protection of families
with children makes illegal the once popular all-adult apartment or
condominium complex. Although there are exemptions for housing
for older persons, the requirements to keep the exempt status can
be tricky.
HUD and NCHRC interact and function well together. When
faced with a client having a fair housing claim, the attorney must
stay aware of how the state and federal enforcement systems func-
tion together. The ASFHA provides a better system for quick res-
214. Id. at § 3612(d)(C).
215. Interview, supra note 122.
216. Id.
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olution of complaints either through conciliation, an administrative
process, or litigation. These methods of resolution, combined with
more threatening forms of relief, have transformed the old SFHA
into a potent weapon in civil rights protection.
B. Bailey Liipfert, III
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